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Note 
 
STOKELING v. UNITED STATES: BLURRING THE LINE OF 
WHAT CONSTITUTES PHYSICAL FORCE UNDER THE 
ELEMENTS CLAUSE OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
TAYLOR HALLOWELL∗ 
In Stokeling v. United States,1 the Court addressed whether the elements 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) encompasses Florida’s 
robbery offense, which requires an offender to use force sufficient to over-
come the victim’s resistance.2  Although the Court in Johnson v. United 
States (Johnson I)3 declined to apply the common law definition of “force” 
to interpret whether a battery qualifies as a predicate offense under the ele-
ments clause of the ACCA,4 the Court in Stokeling relied on the common law 
definition of force when considering a robbery conviction in the same con-
text.5  As a result, the Court held that all state robbery statutes requiring a 
defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance categor-
ically qualify as “violent felon[ies]” under the ACCA’s elements clause—no 
matter how minimal that force is.6  The Court incorrectly decided the case, 
because the minimal amount of force that can satisfy Florida robbery does 
not fit the definition of “physical force” set forth by the Court in Johnson I.7  
The Court also failed to align its holding with the underlying purpose of the 
ACCA8 and misconstrued the statutory history of the ACCA.9  Lastly, the 
Court erroneously decided the case on broad grounds that overlooked idio-
syncrasies of Florida robbery, such as minimal force being sufficient and 
merely requiring offenders to carry a firearm for armed robbery.10  The 
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 1.  139 S. Ct. 544 (2019).  
 2.  Id. at 548. 
 3.  559 U.S. 133 (2010). 
 4.  Id. at 139–40.  
 5.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 551–52.  
 6.  Id. at 555.  
 7.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 8.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 9.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 10.  See infra Section IV.D. 
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Stokeling decision is at odds with how the Fourth Circuit has historically 
treated robbery.11  Maryland robbery, which, like Florida robbery, can be sat-
isfied by minimal force, will now most likely join Florida robbery as a crime 
of violence under the elements clause of the ACCA.12 
I.  THE CASE 
Petitioner, Denard Stokeling, was an employee at Tongue & Cheek, a 
restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida.13  On July 27, 2015, police identified 
Stokeling as a suspect of a burglary that occurred at the restaurant early that 
morning.14  A criminal background check revealed that Stokeling had previ-
ous convictions of home invasion, kidnapping, and robbery.15  When the Mi-
ami Beach Police confronted Stokeling, Stokeling confessed to having a gun 
in his backpack.16  Police then opened his backpack to discover a nine-milli-
meter semiautomatic firearm, a magazine, and twelve rounds of ammuni-
tion.17  Stokeling pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing a firearm and 
ammunition as a convicted felon.18  The probation office recommended sen-
tencing Stokeling as an armed career criminal under the “elements clause” of 
the ACCA, which requires an individual who violates Title 18, section 922(g) 
of the United States Code and has three or more prior convictions for a “vio-
lent felony” to be sentenced to at least fifteen years in prison.19  Stokeling 
claimed that his 1997 Florida robbery conviction did not qualify as a predi-
cate offense under the elements clause “because Florida robbery does not 
have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force.’”20 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held 
that Stokeling’s robbery conviction did not qualify as a “violent felony,” 
                                                          
 11.  See infra Section IV.E. 
 12.  See infra Section IV.E. 
 13.  Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019).  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has 
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.”).  
 19.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549; see Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) 
(defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force”).  
 20.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)); see FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 812.13(1) (West 2016) (defining “robbery” as “the taking of money or other property . . . from the 
person or custody of another, . . . when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, 
assault, or putting in fear”).  
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though the court reached this conclusion by applying the incorrect test.21  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that 
Florida robbery categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ele-
ments clause.22  The court reasoned “[t]he force element of Florida robbery 
satisfies the elements clause of the [ACCA]”23 because Florida robbery re-
quires “resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the 
offender.”24  In his concurring opinion, Judge Martin argued the precedent 
the majority applied was wrongly decided.25  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide “whether the ‘force’ required to commit 
robbery under Florida law qualifies as ‘physical force’ for purposes of the 
[ACCA’s] elements clause.”26 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Before 1984, convicted felons prosecuted for possessing a firearm under 
Title 18, section 922(g) of the United States Code were punished with up to 
ten years of imprisonment.27  Then, in 1984, Congress passed the ACCA.28  
The ACCA provides sentencing enhancements for individuals who violate 
section 922(g) and have three previous convictions for a “violent felony.”29  
Thereafter, when an individual is prosecuted for possessing a firearm as a 
convicted felon, an important determination is whether they have three or 
more “violent felony” convictions.30  Section II.A discusses the ACCA as it 
was originally enacted in 1984.31  Section II.B describes the amendments that 
                                                          
 21.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549.  The Supreme Court has held that courts must apply the “cat-
egorical approach” when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under 
the ACCA.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990).  Instead of following the cate-
gorical approach by looking only to the statutory definition of Florida robbery, the district court 
incorrectly based its decision on the particular facts underlying Stokeling’s conviction.  Stokeling, 
139 S. Ct. at 549.  The court ruled that Stokeling’s attempt at removing the victim’s necklaces as 
she held onto them did not justify an enhanced prison sentence.  Id.  
 22.  United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Florida robbery is 
categorically a crime of violence under the elements of even the least culpable of these acts crimi-
nalized by Florida Statutes § 812.13(1).” (quoting United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 941 (11th 
Cir. 2016) and citing United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011))), aff’d, 139 
S. Ct. 544 (2019).  
 23.  Id.   
 24.  Id. at 872 (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).  
 25.  Id. at 876 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Fritts was wrong to suggest that all unarmed robbery 
convictions under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 are violent felonies as defined by ACCA’s elements clause 
because use of ‘any degree of force’ could support a § 812.13 conviction from 1976 to 1997.”).  
 26.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 550.   
 27.  Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015).  
 28.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 
(1984) (explaining the purpose of the ACCA).  
 29.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  See infra Section II.A.  
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Congress made to the ACCA in 1986.32  Section II.C surveys the key treat-
ment of the ACCA by the Supreme Court.33  Section II.D explores the rela-
tionship between Florida robbery and the elements clause of the ACCA.34  
Section II.E examines the treatment of Florida robbery in the federal cir-
cuits.35  Lastly, Section II.F compares Florida robbery with Maryland rob-
bery.36 
A.  The Original Enactment of the ACCA 
In 1984, Congress passed the ACCA in an effort to “curb armed, habit-
ual (career) criminals.”37  Some individuals are more likely than others to 
intentionally cause harm with a firearm.  The ACCA is concerned with pre-
venting the danger created when those individuals possess a gun.38  The 
ACCA originally prescribed a minimum of fifteen years in jail for individuals 
who possessed a firearm following three prior convictions “for robbery or 
burglary.”39  The House Committee chose to originally target only robbery 
and burglary because it viewed those crimes as “the most damaging crimes 
to society.”40  When Senator Arlen Specter introduced the bill, he noted that 
“[r]obberies and burglaries occur with far greater frequency than other vio-
lent felonies, affect many more people, and cause the greatest losses.”41  Sen-
ator Spector also highlighted that “[a] high percentage of robberies and bur-
glaries are committed by a limited number of repeat offenders.”42  It is 
irrefutable that at this point in time, a generic version of robbery qualified as 
a predicate offense under the ACCA.43 
                                                          
 32.  See infra Section II.B. 
 33.  See infra Section II.C. 
 34.  See infra Section II.D. 
 35.  See infra Section II.E. 
 36.  See infra Section II.F. 
 37.  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984).  
 38.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008) (holding that a felony conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” because it does not “show an in-
creased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and 
pull the trigger”). 
 39.  Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 554, 550 (2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) 
(Supp. II 1982)); H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6 (1986) (describing changes made to the original lan-
guage of the ACCA).  Robbery was defined as “any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment 
exceeding one year and consisting of the taking of the property of another from the person or pres-
ence of another by force or violence, or by threatening or placing another person in fear that any 
person will imminently be subjected to bodily harm.”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 7 (highlighting the 
1984 definition of robbery that was proposed to be omitted from the ACCA in 1986).  
 40.  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986). 
     
510 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:506 
B.  The 1986 Amendment to the ACCA 
In 1986, Congress amended the ACCA, removing any mention of “rob-
bery” and substituting the language that is still applicable today.44  The over-
arching purpose of the 1986 amendment was “to increase the participation of 
the Federal law enforcement system in efforts to curb armed, habitual drug 
traffickers and violent criminals.”45  In other words, Congress sought to im-
prove the armed career criminal concept by expanding the number of predi-
cate offenses.46 
In order to qualify as a violent felony, a crime must first be “punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”47  The crime must then 
satisfy at least one of the three clauses created in the 1986 amendment—the 
elements clause,48 the enumerated clause,49 or the residual clause50—which 
describe different qualifications of a violent felony.51  Under the elements 
clause,52 a qualifying crime must have “as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”53  The enu-
merated clause lists generic crimes that Congress intended to be violent fel-
onies.54  These include: burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the 
use of explosives.55  Importantly, the 1986 amendment removed the explicit 
reference to “robbery” found in the original statute, while preserving “bur-
glary” in the enumerated clause.56  The residual clause provided that a felony 
that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another” should be treated as a “violent felony.”57  For 
                                                          
 44.  Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(a), 100 Stat. 3207 
(“Section 924(e)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out ‘for robbery or bur-
glary, or both,’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or 
both.’”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 1 (reporting Congress’s reasoning for amending the 
ACCA). 
 45.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 1. 
 46.  Id. at 3–4. 
 47.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
 48.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phys-
ical force against the person of another”). 
 49.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives”). 
 50.  Id. (“or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another”).  
 51.   Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(b), 100 Stat. 3207; 
see Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Clause (i) 
is often called the ‘elements clause’ . . . . The first part of clause (ii) is often called the ‘enumerated 
clause,’ . . . . The final part of clause (ii) [is] often called the ‘residual clause,’ . . . .”). 
 52.  The elements clause is also sometimes referred to as “the force clause.”  See United States 
v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 53.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  
 54.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 55.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 56.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986); see infra note 186 and accompanying text.  
 57.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
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decades, these three clauses encompassed the three ways by which a prior 
conviction could qualify as a violent felony.58  Courts often interpreted the 
residual clause broadly to include a large range of offenses59 until 2015 when 
the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States (Johnson II)60 struck the re-
sidual clause down for being unconstitutionally vague.61 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Elements Clause of the 
ACCA 
The Supreme Court has held that sentencing courts must apply the “cat-
egorical approach” to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a vi-
olent felony under the ACCA.62  Instead of looking to the particular underly-
ing facts, courts using the categorical approach look “only to the fact of 
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”63  Courts apply 
this approach when interpreting both the elements clause and the enumerated 
clause.64  A fact-finding process for every defendant would be impracticable 
and unfair, especially when defendants immediately pleaded guilty to prior 
offenses.65  While the categorical approach has been challenged in several 
recent Supreme Court dissents,66 it is still good law.67 
In the context of the elements clause, the categorical approach requires 
courts to assess whether the least culpable conduct covered by the statute for 
the prior conviction “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another.”68  According to Johnson 
I, physical force in the context of the ACCA means “violent force—that is, 
force capable of causing physical pain or injury.”69 
                                                          
 58.  See Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding “that 
imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process”). 
 59.  Id. at 2556–57.  
 60.  Id. at 2563. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990).   
 63.  Id. at 602.  
 64.  Id. at 600–01. 
 65.  Id. at 601–02.  
 66.  See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1252 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (as-
serting that the Court should abandon the categorical approach); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2269–70 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that if “it is perfectly clear” from the record 
that a crime occurred, then the conviction should be counted); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2295 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When it is clear that a defendant necessarily admitted 
or the jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic burglary, the 
conviction should qualify.”). 
 67.  Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019).  
 68.  Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Johnson v. United States 
(Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010). 
 69.  Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140. 
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In Johnson I, the Supreme Court considered whether Florida battery cat-
egorically qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause.70  The 
Court explicitly rejected the common law definition of “force” in the context 
of battery, which required only minimal contact.71  The Court recognized the 
general rule that common law terms, such as battery, should be interpreted 
with their common law meaning72 as long as the common law definition 
makes sense in context.73  However, when common law definitions do not 
fit, “context determines meaning.”74  The Court ultimately ruled that, in the 
context of a “violent felony,” the common law definition of battery is a “com-
ical misfit.”75  At common law, battery could be “satisfied by even the slight-
est offensive touching.”76  The slightest touch does not rise to the level of 
force required for a crime of violence.77  Therefore, “force” under the ele-
ments clause should be understood as violent force, rather than battery’s com-
mon law definition of force.78  Battery is not a violent felony under the 
ACCA.79 
While “physical force” means “violent force” in the context of violent 
felonies,80 the Supreme Court has held that “physical force” can take on its 
common law definition in other statutory provisions, like domestic vio-
lence.81  In United States v. Castleman,82 Castleman pleaded guilty to injur-
ing “the mother of his child,” in violation of the Tennessee statute.83  Cas-
tleman argued that his conviction should not be interpreted as a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” because the statute did not meet 
the requisite physical force required by the ACCA.84  The Court rejected Cas-
tleman’s argument, distinguishing the ACCA from domestic violence stat-
utes and holding that the degree of force that satisfies common law battery 
qualifies as physical force in the context of domestic violence.85  As a result, 
                                                          
 70.  Id. at 138. 
 71.  Id. at 139–40 (“The common law held [battery’s] element of ‘force’ to be satisfied by even 
the slightest offensive touching.”).  
 72.  Id. at 139 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957)).  
 73.  Id. (citing Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 145. 
 76.  Id. at 139–40. 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 145.  
 80.  Id. at 139–49.  
 81.  United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162–63 (2014) (holding that “force” takes on its 
common law meaning of “offensive touching” in the context of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence”). 
 82.  572 U.S. 157 (2014). 
 83.  Id. at 161 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp. 2002). App. 27).  
 84.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2012)).  
 85.  Id. at 167–68. 
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Castleman’s conviction qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence.86 
The Court reasoned that Congress likely “meant to incorporate the mis-
demeanor-specific meaning of ‘force’ in defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.’”87  The Court distinguished domestic violence from a 
violent felony by noting that domestic violence is “a term of art encompass-
ing acts that one might not characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic con-
text.”88  The Court in Castleman further supported its conclusion by stating 
that “a contrary reading would have rendered [section] 922(g)(9) inoperative 
in many States at the time of its enactment.”89  If the Court had not interpreted 
offensive touch to constitute physical force under section 922(g)(9), the stat-
ute would not have been applicable in California and at least nine other 
states.90  States with domestic abuse statutes that prohibit only the causation 
of bodily injury would remain unaffected.91  However, some states prohibit 
both offensive bodily contact and the causation of bodily injury.92  Section 
922(g)(9) would become inoperative in these states if offensive touching did 
not satisfy the statute’s physical force requirement.93 
The Court took a similar approach in Voisine v. United States,94 denying 
an interpretation of section 922(g)(9) that would render it inoperative in 
thirty-five jurisdictions.95  In Voisine, Voisine pleaded guilty to violating 
Maine’s domestic abuse statute, which prohibits causing offensive bodily 
contact or bodily injury with the mental state of purpose, knowledge, or reck-
lessness.96  Voisine argued that he should not be subject to section 
922(g)(9)’s prohibition of firearms for people convicted of domestic vio-
lence, since Maine’s statute can be satisfied by recklessness.97  The Court 
rejected his argument, holding that reckless domestic assault qualifies as a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in part because so many state 
laws include recklessness.98  Two thirds of states punish domestic assault the 
                                                          
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 164. 
 88.  Id. at 165 (defining acts of domestic violence to include “[h]itting, slapping, shoving, grab-
bing, pinching, biting, [and] hair pulling” (alterations in original) (quoting DOJ, OFFICE ON 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domvio-
lence.htm)).  
 89.  Id. at 167. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).  
 95.  Id. at 2280. 
 96.  Id. at 2277.  
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. at 2280 
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same regardless of whether it is committed with the mens rea of recklessness, 
knowledge, or intent.99 
When determining whether a crime qualifies as a predicate offense for 
the ACCA, the Supreme Court also considers whether offenders of the crime 
would be more dangerous with a gun.100  In Begay v. United States,101 the 
Court held that driving under the influence is not a violent felony under the 
ACCA because individuals who drive under the influence are not necessarily 
more likely to commit intentionally violent crimes.102  Driving under the in-
fluence—despite being objectively dangerous—does not make an individual 
more dangerous with a gun.103 
D.  The Requirements of Florida Robbery 
When determining if a state crime qualifies as a “violent felony” under 
the ACCA, “federal courts look to, and are constrained by, state courts’ in-
terpretations of state law.”104  Florida law defines robbery as “the taking of 
money or other property . . . from the person or custody of another, . . . when 
in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or put-
ting in fear.”105  In Robinson v. State,106 the Florida Supreme Court inter-
preted the “use of force” to mean “force sufficient to overcome a victim’s 
resistance.”107  However, “[t]he degree of force used is immaterial,” and can 
be minimal.108  Federal courts are constrained by the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation that the elements of robbery can be satisfied where an offender 
uses only minimal force.109 
                                                          
 99.  Id. at 2278.  
 100.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).  
 101.  553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 102.  Id. at 147–48.  The Begay Court considered whether a conviction for driving under the 
influence qualified as a violent felony under the now struck-down residual clause.  Id. at 140, 144. 
 103.  Id. at 146.  
 104.  United States v. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 
Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)).  
 105.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(1) (West 2016).  
 106.  692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997). 
 107.  Id. at 887.  
 108.  Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922); see also McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 
257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (“Any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”).  But see 
United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that Robinson “abrogated” McCloud’s “any degree of force” holding).  
 109.  See Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010).  
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E.  Federal Circuit Courts’ Treatment of Florida Robbery Convictions 
Under the ACCA 
Federal circuit courts have disagreed about whether Florida robbery 
qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the ACCA.110  
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “Florida robbery is ‘undeniably . . . a vio-
lent felony’” under the elements clause of the ACCA both before Robinson111 
and after.112  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has been critical of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of Florida robbery as a “violent felony,” sug-
gesting that the Eleventh Circuit has focused too much on “the use of force 
sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance,” while overlooking that the 
force can be minimal.113  In United States v. Geozos,114 the Ninth Circuit held 
that robbery under Florida law is not a “violent felony” because the statute 
“proscribes the taking of property even when the force used to take that prop-
erty is minimal.”115  The court reasoned that the Florida robbery statute there-
fore does not require the force used to be violent.116  The Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits are the only Circuit Courts to publish decisions directly addressing 
whether Florida robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA and they are 
split on their interpretation.117 
F. The Relationship Between Florida Robbery and Maryland Robbery 
Florida robbery and Maryland robbery share two significant similarities: 
1) both require force sufficient to overcome resistance of the victim,118 and 
                                                          
 110.  Compare United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing United 
States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006)) (holding that Florida robbery is categorically 
a violent felony), with United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
Florida robbery is not categorically a violent felony).  
 111.  Lee, 886 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Dowd, 451 F.3d at 1255). 
 112.  Id. (citing United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011)).  
 113.  Geozos, 870 F.3d at 901 (“[W]e think that the Eleventh Circuit, in focusing on the fact that 
Florida robbery requires a use of force sufficient to overcome the resistance of the victim, has over-
looked the fact that, if the resistance itself is minimal, then the force used to overcome that resistance 
is not necessarily violent force.”).  
 114.  870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 115.  Id. at 901. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that Florida rob-
bery qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA, United States v. Orr, 685 F. App’x 
263, 267 (4th Cir. 2017), the opinion is unpublished and has since been criticized by the Fourth 
Circuit itself.  United States v. Dinkins, 928 F.3d 349, 356 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019) (“To the extent that 
our unpublished decision in [Orr] suggests that there is a distinction between North Carolina com-
mon law robbery and Florida robbery, that decision did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Stokeling.  Further, as an unpublished decision, Orr is not binding precedent.”).  
 118.  See Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 1997); Cooper v. State, 9 Md. App. 478, 
480, 265 A.2d 569, 571 (1970). 
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2) both may be satisfied by minimal force.119  Under Maryland common law, 
robbery is “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property 
of another from his person by the use of violence or by putting in fear.”120  In 
Maryland, robbery maintains its common law definition121 with two excep-
tions: 1) “robbery includes obtaining the service of another by force or threat 
of force;”122 and 2) “robbery requires proof of intent to withhold property of 
another.”123 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland issued two decisions in 1970 
holding that the “fear” element of robbery may be satisfied by “fear . . . of 
injury to the person or to property, as for example, a threat to burn down a 
house.”124  While these rulings have never been overturned, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has considered the discussion of the 
“fear” element to be mere dicta, since neither case was decided based on fear 
of injury to property.125 
The degree of force required to constitute “violence” for Maryland rob-
bery is functionally equivalent to the degree of force necessary for Florida 
robbery.126  In Maryland—like in Florida—robbery requires force sufficient 
to overcome resistance of the victim.127  However—as in Florida—the force 
used may be minimal.128  The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that “the 
degree of force used . . . [is] immaterial ‘so long as it is sufficient to compel 
the victim to part with his property.’”129  Similarly, the Court of Appeals has 
stated that “[i]f . . . the use of force enables the accused to retain possession 
of the property in the face of immediate resistance from the victim, then the 
taking is properly considered a robbery.”130  On the other hand, sudden 
                                                          
 119.  See McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976); Cooper, 9 Md. App. at 480, 265 
A.2d at 571. 
 120.  Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985).  
 121.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-401(e) (2012).  
 122.  Id. § 3-401(e)(1). 
 123.  Id. § 3-401(e)(2). 
 124.  Giles v. State, 8 Md. App. 721, 723, 262 A.2d 806, 807 (1970) (emphasis added); Douglas 
v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 654, 267 A.2d 291, 295 (1970) (“That the fear be of great bodily harm is 
not a requisite.  Nor need the fear be of bodily injury at all.” (emphasis added)).  
 125.  United States v. Bell, 901 F.3d 455, 471 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he dicta on which Bell relies 
have apparently never been repeated by any Maryland court in the nearly five decades since Douglas 
and Giles were decided.”).  
 126.  See McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (holding that “[a]ny degree of force 
suffices to convert larceny into a robbery” in Florida); Cooper v. State, 9 Md. App. 478, 480, 265 
A.2d 569, 571 (1970) (holding that, for Maryland robbery, “the degree of force used is immate-
rial . . . .”).  
 127.  Cooper, 9 Md. App. at 480, 265 A.2d at 571 (“[S]ufficient force must be used to overcome 
resistance and the mere force that is required to take possession, when there is no resistance, is not 
enough.”).  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 205, 539 A.2d 231, 234 (1988) (quoting Cooper, 9 Md. App. 
at 480, 265 A.2d at 569).  
 130.  Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 188, 699 A.2d 1170, 1185 (Md. 1997).  
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snatching does not amount to robbery in Maryland.131  Therefore, Maryland 
robbery and Florida robbery require equivalent degrees of force. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In 2019 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to directly address 
“whether the ‘force’ required to commit robbery under Florida law qualifies 
as ‘physical force’ for purposes of the elements clause” in Stokeling  v. United 
States.132  Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas determined that the level 
of “force” necessary for Florida robbery—force sufficient to overcome the 
resistance of the victim—equates to the use of “physical force” under the 
elements clause of the ACCA.133  Therefore, Florida robbery, along with all 
other state robbery statutes requiring the offender to overcome the victim’s 
resistance, categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.134 
The Court first drew parallels between the common law definition of 
robbery, the Florida robbery statute, and the language of the ACCA.135  Spe-
cifically, the Court asserted that the definition of robbery in the original 1984 
ACCA was “a clear reference” to common law robbery because both required 
“force or violence.”136  The Court then reasoned that since robbery had its 
common law meaning in the 1984 ACCA, then the mention of “force” in the 
elements clause of the amended ACCA must retain the common law defini-
tion of “force.”137  Subsequently, the Court stated that Florida robbery must 
qualify under the elements clause because Florida robbery requires the same 
degree of “force” as what was necessary to commit robbery at common 
law.138 
The Court then discussed how its understanding of “physical force” 
comports with precedent.139  In Johnson I, the Court held that “‘physical 
force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or 
injury.”140  The Court reasoned that, though battery did not amount to “phys-
ical force,” robbery is distinguishable.141  The Court argued that “the force 
                                                          
 131.  See West, 312 Md. at 206, 539 A.2d at 235 (“As in Cooper, the victim here was never 
placed in fear; she did not resist; she was not injured.”).   
 132.  139 S. Ct. 544, 550 (2019). 
 133.  Id. at 555.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. at 550–52.  
 136.  Id. at 551.  
 137.  Id. at 551–52 (“By replacing robbery as an enumerated offense with a clause that has 
‘force’ as its touchstone, Congress made clear that ‘force’ retained the same common-law definition 
that undergirded the original definition of robbery adopted a mere two years earlier.”).  
 138.  Id. at 555.  
 139.  Id. at 552–53.  
 140.  Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
 141.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 553.  
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necessary to overcome a victim’s physical resistance is inherently ‘violent,’” 
while the “slightest offensive touching” is not.142 
Finally, the Court described the consequences of ruling for Stokeling.143  
The Court highlighted that “many States’ robbery statutes would not qualify 
as ACCA predicates under Stokeling’s reading.”144  The Court also rejected 
Stokeling’s proposed definition for “physical force”—force “reasonably ex-
pected to cause pain or injury”145—because it would be difficult for lower 
courts to assess whether a crime is categorically expected to cause bodily 
injury.146 
In her dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsberg, and 
Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for “distort[ing] 
Johnson.”147  Contrary to the majority’s holding, Justice Sotomayor found 
the minimal force that can satisfy Florida robbery148 does not rise to the level 
of “violent force” required by Johnson I.149  Justice Sotomayor also argued 
that the Florida robbery statute is so broad that not all offenders “present the 
increased risk of gun violence” that the ACCA seeks to target.150  Addition-
ally, Justice Sotomayor suggested the effects of ruling for Stokeling were not 
as extreme as the majority insinuated, since neither party offered evidence of 
how many state robbery statutes are satisfied by minimal force.151 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Stokeling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Florida rob-
bery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA because the term “phys-
ical force” in the elements clause includes the amount of force necessary to 
overcome a victim’s resistance.152  The Court’s holding was ultimately incor-
rect because it is inconsistent with the Court’s previous holding in John-
son I.153  In addition, the Court failed to align its holding with the underlying 
                                                          
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. at 554.  
 144.  Id. at 552. 
 145.  Id. at 554.  
 146.  Id. (“We decline to impose yet another indeterminable line-drawing exercise on the lower 
courts.”).  
 147.  Id. at 555 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 148.  Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922) (holding that “[t]he degree of force used 
is immaterial”); see also McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (“Any degree of force 
suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”).  But see United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 
871 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that Robinson “abrogated” McCloud’s 
“any degree of force” holding). 
 149.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also supra Section II.C. 
 150.  Id. at 559 (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008)).  
 151.  Id. at 563–64.  
 152.  Id. at 555.  
 153.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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purpose of the ACCA,154 and misconstrued the statutory history of the 
ACCA.155  Furthermore, the Court erroneously decided the case on broad 
grounds that overlooked idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery.156 The decision is 
at odds with how the Fourth Circuit has treated robbery statutes satisfied by 
minimal force, and will most likely transform Maryland robbery into being a 
crime of violence under the elements clause.157 
A.  The Court’s Holding Is Incorrect Because It Is Inconsistent with 
Johnson I 
The Court improperly reasoned that Johnson I is distinguishable from 
Stokeling.158  In Johnson I, the Supreme Court held that “in the context of a 
statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means vi-
olent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to an-
other person.”159  Rather than looking at the word “capable” in context, the 
majority turned to dictionary definitions, insisting that the word “does not 
require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used 
will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality.”160  The Johnson I Court, 
however, could not have meant “capable” as “potentiality,” because the bat-
tery statute that the Johnson I Court rejected as being a “violent felony” cov-
ered actions with the potentiality of causing injury.161  In her dissent, Justice 
Sotomayor noted, “As any first-year torts student (or person with a shoulder 
injury) quickly learns, even a tap on the shoulder is ‘capable of causing phys-
ical pain or injury’ in certain cases.”162  The slightest touch has the potential 
of causing pain.163 
Florida robbery does not meet the Johnson I Court’s definition of “phys-
ical force” because Florida robbery—similar to battery—is satisfied by min-
imal force.164  Most notably, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “[a]ny 
degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”165  For example, 
a thief who “peel[s] [his victim’s] fingers back in order to get the money” is 
                                                          
 154.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 155.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 156.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 157.  See infra Section IV.E.  
 158.  Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 159.  Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); see also Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the word “force” in the “legal community” must mean force 
that is “violent in nature—the sort that is intended to cause bodily injury, or at a minimum likely to 
do so”).  
 160.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 554. 
 161.  Id. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id.  
 165.  McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976); see also Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 
157, 159 (Fla. 1922) (“The degree of force used is immaterial.”). 
     
520 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:506 
a robber in Florida, even though the victim does not “put up greater re-
sistance.”166  The Stokeling majority focused on the fact that Florida robbery 
requires force sufficient to overcome the resistance of a victim,167 while over-
looking that the force can be minimal.168  Because Florida robbery can be 
conducted with minimal force, the least culpable conduct of Florida robbery 
is outside the scope of the Johnson I Court’s definition of physical force.169 
The practical result of the Court’s holding is that there are now two def-
initions of “physical force” within a single statutory provision—one defini-
tion for battery and another for robbery.170  The Court in Johnson I expressly 
rejected ascribing the common law definition of “force” to physical force in 
the context of battery.171  By construing “physical force” in the context of 
robbery to have the common law definition of “force,”172 the Court has cre-
ated two different meanings for a phrase within a single statutory provi-
sion.173  This “is a radical and unsupportable step” leading to “a brave new 
world of textual interpretation.”174  The Court’s reasoning should have been 
grounded in the precedent set in Johnson I, which would have led to Florida 
robbery not qualifying as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.175 
                                                          
 166.  Sanders v. State, 769 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also Robinson v. State, 
692 So. 2d 883, 887 n.10 (Fla. 1997) (explaining that a theft in Florida would transform into a 
robbery if a victim were to catch a pickpocket’s arm and the pickpocket then pulled free).  Compare 
Sanders, 769 So. 2d at 507, with Goldsmith v. State, 573 So. 2d 445, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that snatching money without contacting the victim’s hand is not robbery in Florida).  
 167.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555; Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 1997) (interpret-
ing the “use of force” in the context of a purse snatching to mean “force sufficient to overcome a 
victim’s resistance”).  
 168.  Montsdoca, 93 So. at 159 (“The degree of force used is immaterial.”); see also McCloud, 
335 So. 2d at 258 (“Any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”).  But see United 
States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
Robinson’s requirement of force sufficient to overcome resistance of the victim repudiated 
McCloud’s “any degree of force” holding). 
 169.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 170.  Id. at 560. 
 171.  Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 139–40 (2010).  
 172.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555.  
 173.  Id. at 560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 174.  Id.  In contrast, holding “physical force” to have two different definitions within two dif-
ferent statutory provisions is not problematic.  United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162–63 
(2014) (holding that “physical force” takes on its common law meaning of “offensive touching” in 
the context of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”). 
 175.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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B.  The Court Failed to Align Its Holding with the Underlying Purpose 
of the ACCA 
The nature of Florida robbery does not comport with the underlying pur-
pose of the ACCA.176  In Begay v. United States,177 the Supreme Court ex-
plained the ACCA was designed to target “the special danger created when a 
particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—possesses 
a gun.”178  The Begay Court then held that a felony conviction for driving 
under the influence of alcohol is not a violent felony because it does not 
“show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who 
might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”179  Similarly, the Flor-
ida robbery statute is so broad that not all offenders “bear the hallmarks of 
being the kind of people who are likely to point a gun and pull the trigger.”180  
An individual can be convicted for robbery in Florida by merely “engaging 
in a tug-of-war over the victim’s purse.”181  This minimal amount of force 
does not make an individual more likely to be dangerous with a gun,182 and 
misses the statutory purpose of controlling violent crimes committed by vio-
lent career criminals.183  The Stokeling decision has made the ACCA too 
overinclusive.  The ACCA can now treat individuals who have only ever used 
minimal force as violent career criminals.  Three counts of robbery with min-
imal force should not equate to a minimum of fifteen years in prison.  The 
ACCA ought to only be applied in cases where the offender is likely to be 
violent with a firearm.   
C.  The Court Misconstrued the Statutory History of the ACCA 
The statutory history of the ACCA does not suggest a common law def-
inition of “force” in the context of robbery, as the Stokeling Court pro-
posed.184  When Congress amended the ACCA in 1986, it removed a refer-
ence to robbery while keeping the word burglary.185  When Congress deletes 
a statutory provision while retaining other language, the Court generally has 
                                                          
 176.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984) (describing Congress’s intended purpose of the 
ACCA). 
 177.  553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 178.  Id. at 146; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.   
 180.  Stokeling, S. Ct. at 559 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 181.  Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing McCloud v. 
State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258–59 (Fla. 1976)).  
 182.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 559 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 183.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990). 
 184.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 562–63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 185.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986) (describing changes made to the original language of 
the ACCA). 
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“no trouble concluding that” Congress does so with purpose.186  Congress 
most likely had a purpose for deleting robbery because Congress had the 
choice to enumerate robbery alongside burglary in the amended ACCA, but 
chose not to do so.187  Moreover, since robbery and burglary were the only 
two crimes enumerated in the original ACCA,188 “it is inconceivable that 
Congress simply lost track of robbery.”189  Perhaps Congress deleted robbery 
and added the elements clause both as a way to 1) limit robbery convictions 
to those requiring a threshold degree of force, and 2) expand then number of 
predicate offenses involving physical force. 
The Court argued that Congress’ “stated intent to expand the number of 
qualifying offenses” supports the notion of reading “force” to include the 
crime of robbery under the elements clause.190  The Court, however, over-
looked the fact that the amended version of the ACCA would encompass 
many more predicate crimes even if no robbery statutes were to qualify.191  
The elements clause, the lengthened enumerated clause, and the residual 
clause all allowed for many more predicate offenses to qualify under the 
amended ACCA.192  Moreover, even if Congress had wanted robbery to re-
main a predicate offense, it is possible that Congress could have intended for 
it to fall under the now struck-down residual clause.193  For example, before 
the Court struck down the residual clause in Johnson II, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit considered Florida robbery to be a violent felony 
under the residual clause.194 
                                                          
 186.  Dir. of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U.S. 316, 324 (2001) (stating that if Congress 
had deleted a sentence limiting a tax exemption while retaining the sentence granting the exemption, 
then it would have been clear that Congress intended the exemption to apply to cooperatives without 
limitation). 
 187.  See id. (suggesting that when Congress deletes some statutory language while keeping sur-
rounding language, it has motivation to do so).  
 188.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (describing changes made to the original language of the 
ACCA). 
 189.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 561–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 190.  Id. at 551 (majority opinion).  
 191.  Id. at 562 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 192.  Id.  
 193.  Id.; Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding “that 
imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process”); see also United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that Florida’s “robbery by sudden snatching” presented “‘a serious risk of physical injury to another’ 
under the residual clause”).  Crimes previously housed under the residual clause now must satisfy 
the elements clause to be considered violent felonies.  See Conrad Kahn & Danli Song, A Touchy 
Subject: The Eleventh Circuit’s Tug-of-War over What Constitutes Violent “Physical Force,” 72 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1130, 1135 (2018) (“Without the residual clause, the validity of thousands of 
ACCA enhancements now depends on whether predicate convictions qualify under the elements 
clause . . . .”). 
 194.  Welch, 683 F.3d at 1312. 
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D.  The Court Erroneously Decided the Case on Broad Grounds That 
Overlooked Idiosyncrasies of Florida Robbery 
The effects of ruling for Stokeling are not as extreme as the Court sug-
gested.195  The Court asserted that finding for Stokeling would effectively 
exclude the majority of state robbery statutes from qualifying as violent fel-
onies because a majority of states define robbery as requiring force that over-
comes the resistance of the victim.196  This reasoning is flawed.197  Im-
portantly, neither party offered information on how many states allow 
minimal force to satisfy their requirement of overcoming the victim’s re-
sistance.198  While some states do have robbery laws that may be satisfied by 
minimal force,199 other state laws are more like South Carolina’s, which re-
quires more than minimal force when overcoming a victim’s resistance.200  
Thus, the Court should have framed this case more narrowly, as presenting 
only the question of “whether a robbery offense that has as an element the 
use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance—even if that re-
sistance is minimal—necessitates the use of ‘physical force’ within the mean-
ing of the ACCA.”201  Under Johnson I, the answer to that question is a re-
sounding “no.”202  Even if the Court’s ruling would disallow many robbery 
statutes from qualifying as predicate offenses under the ACCA, this alone is 
not a compelling reason for the Court’s decision.203  The number of possible 
violent felonies was also decreased when Congress chose not to enumerate 
robbery204 and when the Court struck down the residual clause.205 
                                                          
 195.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 563–64 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 196.  Id. at 552 (majority opinion).  
 197.  Id. at 563 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 198.  Id.  
 199.  See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803–04 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
“North Carolina common law robbery does not categorically match the force clause of the ACCA” 
because it requires only “minimal contact”); United States v. Lattanzio, 232 F. Supp. 3d 220, 229 
(D. Mass. 2017) (holding that Massachusetts robbery is not a violent felony under the ACCA be-
cause Massachusetts robbery can be satisfied by minimal force); United States v. Dunlap, 162 F. 
Supp. 3d 1106, 1114–15 (D. Or. 2016) (holding that Oregon robbery does not qualify as a predicate 
offense under the ACCA because Oregon robbery “requires only minimal force”). 
 200.  United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that South Carolina 
robbery meets the physical force threshold because “there is no indication that South Carolina rob-
bery by violence can be committed with minimal actual force”); see also United States v. Harris, 
844 F.3d 1260, 1267–68 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that Colorado robbery is categorically a crime of 
violence under the ACCA because “robbery in Colorado requires a violent taking”).  
 201.  Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 563 n.3 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added). 
 202.  Id. at 555.  Minimal force is not necessarily “violent force.”  See Johnson v. United States 
(Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (defining “physical force” as “violent force—that is, force 
capable of causing physical pain or injury”). 
 203.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 563 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 204.  See supra Section II.B; see also supra text accompanying note 169.  
 205.  See supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
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The Court also feared that ruling for Stokeling would exclude many 
armed robbery statutes.206  Admittedly, holding that basic Florida robbery 
does not qualify under the ACCA would also exclude Florida armed rob-
bery207 from qualifying under the ACCA.208  However, “there is scant reason 
to believe” that many other state armed robbery statutes would be affected, 
because Florida armed robbery “stems from the idiosyncrasy” of merely re-
quiring offenders to carry a firearm, without necessarily displaying it.209 
The Court’s broad inclusion of all robbery statutes that require offenders 
to overcome resistance of the victim will have the effect of enhancing prison 
sentences for individuals who have only ever used minimal force.210  Classi-
fying individuals who use only minimal force as violent felons misses the 
purpose of the ACCA, which is to “incarcerat[e] dangerous career crimi-
nals.”211 
E.  Impact of the Stokeling Decision on Maryland Law 
Maryland may be among the states affected by the Stokeling decision.  
Since the Court in Stokeling held that all state robbery statutes requiring a 
defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance categor-
ically qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA’s elements clause,212 Mar-
yland robbery is now most likely a violent felony.  The one caveat is that 
Giles v. State213 and Douglas v. State214—the two decisions stating that Mar-
yland robbery may be satisfied by fear of harm to property—are still good 
law.215  Even though the Maryland Court of Appeals has criticized the rulings 
as dicta that have never again been relied upon,216 it is possible that Maryland 
could rely on these cases in the future to circumvent the Stokeling decision.  
                                                          
 206.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 552 (majority opinion).  
 207.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(2)(a) (West 2016). 
 208.  See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 552 (“Florida requires the same element of ‘force’ for both 
armed robbery and basic robbery.”); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (quoting FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 812.13) (implying that Florida has the same “force” requirement for both basic and 
armed robbery).  
 209.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 564 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Burris, 875 So. 2d at 413. 
 210.  See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“While [Florida robbery] can, 
of course, be accomplished with more than minimal force, [it] need not be.”).  The Court’s holding 
will perhaps have the largest effect on Florida.  Stephen R. Sady, ACCA Lessons: The Armed Career 
Criminal Act—What’s Wrong with “Three Strikes, You’re Out”?, 7 FED. SENT. R. 69, 70 (1994) 
(noting that from 1991 to 1994, “Florida’s three Districts had the same number of ACCA convic-
tions as forty-five other districts put together”).  
 211.  Sady, supra note 210, at 69.  
 212.  Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555.   
 213.  8 Md. App. 721, 723, 261 A.2d 806, 807 (1970). 
 214.  9 Md. App. 647, 652–53, 267 A.2d 291, 295 (1970). 
 215.  See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.  
 216.  United States v. Bell, 901 F.3d 455, 471 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he dicta on which Bell relies 
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The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as a crime that “has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”217  So, if a Maryland court were to rely on the dicta construing 
robbery to include threats against property in a precedential opinion, then the 
“application of force to property” would be “insufficient to trigger an ACCA 
enhancement.”218  On the other hand, if Maryland were to either overrule or 
continue to ignore the Giles and Douglas dicta, then the Stokeling decision 
would cause Maryland robbery to be a violent felony for the purposes of the 
ACCA enhancement. 
Prior to Stokeling, however, Maryland robbery has not generally been 
considered a violent felony.219  While the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit has never directly ruled on whether Maryland robbery con-
stitutes a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA,220 the court’s 
treatment of other states’ robbery laws sheds light onto how it would view 
Maryland robbery.  For example, in United States v. Gardner,221 the Fourth 
Circuit considered whether North Carolina common law robbery qualified as 
a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the ACCA.222  Like Maryland 
robbery, “North Carolina common law robbery . . . requires the taking of 
property by means of ‘violence’ or ‘fear.’”223  The Fourth Circuit emphasized 
that “even de minimis contact can constitute the ‘violence’ necessary for a 
common law robbery conviction under North Carolina law.”224  The court 
then turned to Johnson I, and held that the minimal force that can satisfy 
North Carolina robbery does not rise to the level of “violent force” necessary 
to qualify as a “violent felony” under the elements clause.225  Thus, the Fourth 
                                                          
 217.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 218.  United States v. Clarke, 171 F. Supp. 3d 449, 455 n.7 (D. Md. 2016). 
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 223.  Id. at 801; see also State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C. 1982) (defining North Car-
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 225.  Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803–04 (holding that because North Carolina robbery includes acts 
involving “even minimal contact” with the victim, “the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction . . . does not necessarily include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of ‘force capa-
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ACCA” (quoting Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). 
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Circuit has treated robbery requiring only minimal force—like Maryland rob-
bery—as not qualifying as a “violent felony” under the elements clause of 
the ACCA.  The Stokeling decision will therefore affect how robbery is in-
terpreted in the Fourth Circuit, since the Supreme Court’s ruling is in direct 
contradiction to past Fourth Circuit precedent. 
Courts from other circuits have historically asserted that Maryland rob-
bery is not a crime of violence.  For instance, in 2017, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Maryland robbery is not a 
violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA because it does “not 
require the requisite use of physical force.”226  The district court has also 
stated that Maryland robbery does not qualify as a predicate offense because 
the minimal amount of “force required to overcome resistance and support a 
conviction for Maryland [r]obbery does not necessarily rise to the level of 
violent force capable of causing physical injury.”227  In addition, the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has held that 
“Maryland robbery . . . does not qualify as a predicate offense under the 
ACCA.”228  The Stokeling decision, however, will most likely cause Mary-
land robbery to join Florida robbery as a “violent felony” under the elements 
clause of the ACCA.  As a result, individuals convicted of three Maryland 
robberies who violate section 922(g) could be considered violent career crim-
inals and sentenced to over fifteen years in prison, even if they have only ever 
used minimal force. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Stokeling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that all state rob-
bery statutes requiring the amount of force necessary to overcome the vic-
tim’s resistance categorically qualify as “violent felonies” under the elements 
clause of the ACCA.229  The Court incorrectly decided the case because the 
minimal amount of force that can satisfy Florida robbery does not fit the def-
inition of “physical force” set forth by the Court in Johnson I.230  By qualify-
ing Florida robbery as a “violent felony,” the Court failed to align its holding 
with the underlying purpose of the ACCA—to target violent career crimi-
nals.231  The Court also misconstrued the statutory history of the ACCA by 
going to great lengths to compare common law definitions, while failing to 
give proper weight to the fact that Congress chose to delete “robbery” and 
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keep “burglary.”232  Lastly, the Court erroneously framed the case too 
broadly, overlooking the idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery.233  The Stokeling 
decision directly contradicts how the Fourth Circuit has historically ruled on 
robbery.234  Maryland robbery, which, like Florida robbery, can be satisfied 
by minimal force, will now most likely join Florida robbery as a crime of 
violence under the elements clause of the ACCA.235 
                                                          
 232.  See supra Section IV.C. 
 233.  See supra Section IV.D. 
 234.  See supra Section IV.E. 
 235.  See supra Section IV.E.  
